Effective environmental justice policy requires an understanding of the economic and social forces that determine the correlation between race, income, and pollution exposure. We show how the traditional approach used in many EJ analyses cannot identify nuisance-driven residential mobility. We develop an alternative strategy that overcomes this problem and implement it using data on air toxics from Los Angeles County. Differences in estimated willingness-to-pay for cleaner air across race groups support the residential mobility explanation. Our results suggest that household mobility responses will eventually work against policies designed to address inequitable siting decisions for facilities with environmental health risks. JEL Classification Codes: C33, D63, Q53, R21, R23
INTRODUCTION
The environmental justice (EJ) movement in the United States is generally acknowledged to have grown out of the events following the illegal dumping of thirty-one-thousand gallons of PCB contaminated oil along 240 miles of North Carolina highways in 1978. 1 Subsequent to the prosecution of those responsible for the dumping, the government of North Carolina was tasked with disposing of over forty-thousand cubic yards of contaminated soil. The contentious process that ensued resulted in the creation of a landfill site in Warren County, which was (and continues to be) predominantly low-income and black, despite the availability of arguably better sites elsewhere in the state. The protests that followed the siting decision led to influential studies by the General Accounting Office (GAO 1983) and the United Church of Christ's Commission on Racial Justice (UCC 1987) that demonstrated that poor and minority communities were disproportionately exposed to hazardous wastes in many parts of the United States. The movement that followed these studies led to President Bill Clinton's issuing of Executive Order 12898 in 1994, requiring all federal agencies to take environmental justice concerns into consideration when making rules. A consequence of this order is that federal agencies require some understanding of the nature of and causes behind inequitable exposure to pollution sources. The research community has subsequently followed with a large (and growing) EJ literature.
EJ policy concerns have not dissipated since Clinton's executive order -in fact, they have recently gained renewed attention from the EPA. 2 Moreover, research continues to show that disproportionate exposure to pollution is still an issue. Two decades after its historic EJ analysis, the United Church of Christ (2007) reported that over five million people of color live within one mile of a hazardous waste facility. Given the persistence of this outcome, EJ researchers have continued 1 For a general discussion of the Ward Transformer case and the events that followed, see Exchange Project (2006) . 2 See the details of the EPA's "Plan EJ 2014" at www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/plan-ej.
to gather evidence for and against the competing explanations for the observed correlations between race, income, and pollution. Is it the result of inequitable (possibly discriminatory) siting of landfills, hazardous waste facilities, sources of toxic emissions, and other "locally undesirable land uses" (LULU's)? Is it the result of disproportionate or discriminatory application of enforcement activities? Alternatively, is it the result of residential mobility that follows the siting of a nuisance?
Residential mobility presents a challenge for some EJ policies since it suggests that the policy goal of equitable exposure may be undermined when residents with the means to do so move away from a LULU and their homes are re-populated by lower income residents (see, for example, Been 1994 ).
Economic models of housing demand provide a useful framework for understanding how environmental injustice is related to residential mobility. Each year, more than 30 million people move from one home to another (US Bureau of the Census 2011a). The most common reason given for changing homes is the need for more living space or a better neighborhood; this is especially true for moves made within a county (US Census Bureau 2011b). Although additional living space and better neighborhoods can be purchased or rented by reallocating expenditures toward housing structure and neighborhood quality and reducing consumption of other goods, homebuyers and renters do have alternatives. For example, a mover might choose a home that is located near a hazardous waste site or other LULU -this behavior has typically been referred to as "coming to a nuisance" (Been 1994) or "minority move-in" (Morello-Frosch et al. 2002) . A model of utility maximizing households trading-off housing stock, neighborhood quality, and other (dis)amenities is at the heart of most residential sorting models (see Kuminoff, Smith and Timmins (2013) for an overview) and could explain "coming to the nuisance" as a rational response to opportunities in the housing marketplace. Measuring the tradeoffs made by different groups of homebuyers and renters requires knowing their circumstances both before and after their moves. Without individual "before and after" information, finding evidence of the residential mobility hypothesis (both "fleeing the nuisance" by some groups and "coming to the nuisance" by others) is difficult.
EJ researchers have historically turned to readily-available geographically aggregated (e.g. census tract) data describing population flows in order to look for evidence of nuisance-driven residential mobility. That approach, however, has drawbacks. Our paper shows how those traditional empirical models are unidentified, but offers an alternative. Applying that alternative approach to data from Los Angeles County, we find that residential mobility indeed plays an important role in determining the observed correlations between income, race, and pollution exposure while the traditional model continues to discount the role of residential mobility. The results raise questions about the strength of the existing evidence against residential mobility and the effectiveness of commonly proposed EJ policies. Our results support suggestions (e.g., Banzhaf 2012) that dealing with environmental injustice may require addressing income disparities.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the EJ literature that has sought to distinguish the competing roles of market dynamics and inequitable siting, and explains why the approach typically used to recover the role of residential mobility is not actually able to do so.
Section 3 describes the data sets that we use to model residential decisions and neighborhood sociodemographics, and discusses how we measure the "nuisance" in our empirical application -in particular, the risk of cancer taken from the EPA's National Air Toxics Assessment. Section 4 uses those data to estimate both a traditional EJ model of residential mobility and our alternative model.
Results are reported and contrasted with one another. Section 5 concludes and discusses policy implications.
UNRAVELING THE CAUSES OF RACE-INCOME-POLLUTION CORRELATION

Previous Research
A number of early longitudinal studies found little or no evidence of nuisance-driven residential mobility, concluding instead that significant demographic changes had not occurred after the siting of hazardous waste storage and disposal facilities (Oakes, Anderton, and Anderson 1996; Been and Gupta 1997; Shaikh and Loomis 1999; Pastor, Sadd, and Hipp 2001; Morello-Frosch et al. 2002) . Like our analysis, the study by Pastor, Sadd, and Hipp (2001) focuses on Los Angeles
County. Similar to most other studies, it adopts a geographically aggregated (census tract) approach and uses multivariable regression and simultaneous equation methods to conclude that disproportionate facility siting provides a better explanation for the correlation between race and proximity to toxic storage and disposal facilities.
There have, however, been some assessments of residential choice behavior that do provide evidence in favor of housing market dynamics. Been (1994) , for example, finds evidence in favor of both the disproportionate siting and residential mobility hypotheses in her study of the areas surrounding the sites used by GAO (1983) and Bullard (1983) . Using geographically aggregated choices, Cameron and McConnaha (2006) examine environmentally motivated migration near four Superfund sites and find evidence in favor of nuisance-driven residential mobility for some of them. Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) use a model based on Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984) to predict that communities experiencing reductions in TRI emissions will see increases in total population, and they confirm this prediction with data from California. Additionally, they predict that increases in air pollution levels will encourage higher income households to exit a community, whereas lower income households will be more likely to enter. However, Banzhaf and McCormick (2007) demonstrate that similar predictions cannot be made about neighborhood-level race variables when homebuyers have heterogeneous preferences. Banzhaf and Walsh (2010) demonstrate that predictions become even more complicated when homebuyers have preferences for the race of their neighbors.
Crowder and Downey (2010) conduct one of the only analyses in the EJ literature to use individual-level choice data to examine proximity to pollution (toxic emissions measured at the census tract level), propensity to move, and the neighborhoods chosen by black and Latino households. Their study finds that, when they move, black and Latino households tend to move into neighborhoods with significantly higher emissions measured by the Toxic Release Inventory than comparable white households, suggesting a population dynamic that would lead to disproportionate pollution exposure by race. While their paper provides important insights, it is important to note that their analysis cannot assess how an individual's pollution exposure changes when she moves from one house to another. Seeing a purchase of a house two miles from a toxic site can be interpreted in different ways depending on the conditions in which the homebuyer started. If the buyer comes from a house that is one mile from a site, the purchase would result in reduced exposure. If the buyer comes from a house ten miles from a site, the purchase would result in increased exposure.
Examining the attributes of either individual home purchases or comparing houses sold by different groups likewise does not address the exposure changes generated by household moves.
Although individual-choice data are a welcome addition to the EJ literature, their use is generally limited by data constraints. Analysis of geographically aggregated choice data will continue to be a popular and practical method until more individual panel applications are developed. Next, we show why methods typically used to analyze aggregated choice data are unidentified.
Non-Identification in the Traditional Model of Residential Mobility
In the absence of clear theoretical predictions about the response of race to pollution, assessing the role of residential mobility becomes an empirical question. However, geographically aggregated population statistics (e.g., changes in census tract demographics) cannot be used as evidence for or against the hypotheses of "white flight" or that people of color "come to the nuisance" to meet housing needs. To illustrate why, we work through the following simple example.
Consider a city with just three locations (j = 1, 2, 3) observed in each of two time periods (t = A, B). We use to measure the population in location j in period t. 3 is used to denote the share of individuals in location k in period A who choose to reside in location j in period B. The market dynamics associated with this collection of locations are described by the following system of equations:
A traditional EJ analysis considers the change in the population of a particular sub-group in each location j (i.e., ) and compares it to the exposure to the environmental amenity associated with the location (α j ). Δpop j α j > 0 is taken as evidence that members of the sub-group in question "flee the nuisance" (or, alternatively, "come to the amenity"). Unfortunately, the interpretation is not that simple. The individual behavior of "coming to" or "fleeing from" the 3 In most EJ analyses, will refer to the population of a particular race or income sub-group. 
nuisance is instead described by the elements of the matrix and the way in which co-varies with the change in exposure associated with the move from k to j . The elements of provide a true measure of how the change in exposure associated with a move affects the tendency of individuals to make that move.
The empirical challenge is that the change in population vectors over time does not identify . Recognizing that (2) equations (1) and (2) constitute a system of six equations with nine unknown values of . The system is, therefore, under-identified. Put differently, without additional structure, there is not a unique matrix that can explain the observed changes in aggregate populations. We expand upon this idea with a series of numerical examples. In each, we consider a different matrix, but maintain the same distribution of amenity levels in both periods:
In the first two numerical examples, is constructed to yield the same changes to population in each location:
. As a result, both examples are characterized by the same aggregate population dynamics. Although a traditional EJ 4 In our application, amenities do change over time. However, as is the case in the rest of the EJ literature, we do not model individuals as having foresight with respect to how amenities will evolve in the future. In particular, we model movements between periods A and B assuming that individuals observe the amenity levels in period A and treat those amenity levels as fixed; between periods B and C, individuals might move again after realizing updated amenity values in period B. Bayer, McMillan, Murphy and Timmins (2011) estimate a model of forward looking residential homebuyers. For the purposes of the present analysis, that approach is impractical both in terms of computational requirements and data needs; in particular, using it in an EJ context would also require modeling the housing tenure decision (i.e., ownership versus renting), which is well beyond the methodological scope and data availability of the current literature.
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Our third numerical example shows that nuisance-based sorting can still occur at the individual level even when the aggregate distribution does not change. In Example #3, the aggregate population distribution remains constant between periods A and B; however, the correlation between 5 In each case, we use observations where , noting that the elements in each column of must sum to 1. Only two of the three elements in each column can therefore be considered as independent observations. This leaves us with a small sample size of just six observations in each regression.
and reveals residential mobility consistent with "coming to the nuisance" (an estimated coefficient of -7.50). Previous EJ research may have therefore overlooked nuisance-based sorting after determining that the population distributions do not exhibit economically and statistically significant responses to the placement of environmental harms.
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All three examples make clear that aggregate population dynamics alone are not able to distinguish the change in circumstances individuals face when moving.
DATA
The National Air Toxics Assessment (NATA)
NATA is an assessment published by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that provides risk levels for cancer and other non-cancer respiratory and neurological effects at the census tract level, based on chronic exposure to air toxics. Included in the dataset is the amount of risk that results from "on-road," "not-on-road," and "background" sources of pollution. In order to
calculate risk values, the EPA first collects emissions data in the form of the National Emissions
Inventory. Air dispersion models are then used to estimate ambient concentrations of the emitted toxins. Those concentrations are combined with known natural sources of toxins. Local monitoring devices are then used to check the accuracy of the model's predictions. Ambient concentration is then converted to an exposure concentration, which measures the amount of each pollutant that people actually breath. This number can vary across individuals based on lifestyle (e.g., how much
time is spent being active outside) but is a key metric in determining health risk. Based on the known health effects of the measured toxins, the EPA quantifies the risk for the defined community assuming lifetime exposure at the emissions levels measured at that time.
The 1999 NATA uses information on concentrations of 177 toxic substances (in addition to diesel particulate matter) to measure health risk at the census-tract level from breathing the pollutants. 6 NATA ignores criteria pollutants (PM, NOx, SOx, O 3 , and CO) except for lead, which is also classified as a toxic. Measurements of health effects are expressed in terms of the amount by which the rate of incidence (out of one million people) exceeds the normal rate that would be experienced by the population in the absence of the toxic pollution.
While we find similar results across risk categories, we focus attention on cancer risk for the sake of brevity. Cancer risk has also been the focus of previous work on air toxics. In particular, our use of NATA follows upon earlier work in the EJ literature that has focused on lifetime cancer risk Figures 1 describes the spatial distribution within Los Angeles of the two race groups that will be the focus of our analysis (i.e., Hispanics and whites). 7 Figure 2 illustrates the spatial distribution of the NATA cancer risk measure. A clear pattern of correlation between minority status and pollution is evident from simple visual inspection.
Census Tract Data
We use data provided by the U. 
Other Census Tract Attributes
We use a number of variables to describe the differences among census tracts. Second, we use data from RAND California describing the incidence of violent crimes in 2000. Data are organized by "city" and measure the number of incidents per 100,000 residents.
Examples of cities inside Los Angeles County include Pico Rivera, Long Beach, and Huntington
Park. Violent crime is defined as "crimes against people including homicide, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault." We impute crime rates for each census tract using an inverse-distance weighted average of the crime rate in each city.
Finally, we control for the presence of productive activities in areas with air toxics by including the count of the number of Toxic Release Inventory facilities within 1 mile of the border of each census tract in 2000. 9 Polluting activities often generate employment opportunities and are an indicator of economic activity. Failing to account for this confounding factor can lead to an understatement of the costs associated with the pollution.
Moving Costs
Moving costs represent an important component of our model of individual residential decisions. This is both because they help explain why a majority of individuals do not move, even over a seven-year period, and because properly accounting for moving costs provides us with a tool to recover the marginal utility of income. The latter will prove useful when it comes time to compare our estimates across race groups. We use an approach for measuring actual moving costs, consisting of the physical costs of moving, closing costs, search costs associated with finding a new home, and financial costs associated with realtor payments, described by Bieri, Kuminoff, and Pope (2012) .
Using a time horizon of 37 years, a discount rate of 2.5%, we find that a representative move within Los Angeles County incurs an annualized cost of $118.50 in terms of physical moving costs. If the individual is moving from an owned house to another owned house, the assumption is that they pay 3% of the median housing value in both the starting and ending census tracts. 10 To account for the fact that renters do not pay this additional cost, we weight these payments by the percentage of residents in each tract who are homeowners. 11 Using Bieri, Kuminoff, and Pope's data and methodology, we calculate the annualized cost associated with a move outside of LA county (i.e., into our "catch-all" category described below) to be $528.71. Qualitative results are not sensitive to variations in these assumptions.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Establishing the Correlation Between Race and Pollution
We begin by examining correlations between race and NATA risk at the census tract level, since correlation analysis is commonly used to support claims of environmental injustice. In Table 2, we report the correlation between the within-tract percentage of each race group and all NATA risk measures for the 1,921 census tracts. A few simple facts emerge. First, there are strong positive correlations between the three NATA risk categories -our efforts to measure households' willingness to pay to avoid NATA cancer risk exposure will likely therefore capture willingness to pay to avoid neurological and respiratory risk as well. From an epidemiological perspective, this is important, but the interpretation has little practical consequence for an EJ analysis where our concern is with health risks more generally -cancer risk serves as a good proxy. Second, the starkest differences in exposure (across all three pollutants) are found comparing whites and Hispanics;
blacks and Asians fall between these two groups with the former consistently exhibiting a larger positive correlation.
This simple correlation analysis demonstrates that there are patterns fitting the definition of environmental injustice for Hispanics in Los Angeles County, confirming the correlation patterns found previously in the EJ literature. We now look to the ability of the residential mobility hypothesis to explain these patterns.
Traditional Analysis of Residential Mobility
We begin with the traditional EJ residential mobility model, which seeks to explain these exposure patterns by comparing changes in aggregate tract-level demographics with a variety of year 2000 tract attributes and NATA risk. This analysis corresponds to that found in Pastor, Sadd and Hipp (2001) , and is similar to the approach used in many other papers. It is also the model underlying our non-identification discussion in subsection 2.2. In estimating the traditional model, we include the following variables in our baseline specification -NATA cancer risk, TRI facility counts, sociodemographic controls (% public assistance, median household income, age and education distribution variables), housing attributes (numbers of bedrooms, housing age, and % detached) and neighborhood attribute (e.g., school quality, violent crime rate).
As in the rest of the EJ literature, our baseline specification relies on timing to help identify the causal effect of each variable on the change in each race group. In particular, we consider how movements between 2000 and 2007 are driven by 2000 tract-level attributes, which are predetermined. However, variables like racial percentages could be proxies for race-specific unobservables, and pollution measures could be correlated with (and serve as proxies for) unobserved tract characteristics. Our baseline specification employs a rich set of covariates describing neighborhood attributes to address this possibility. However, we include three additional specifications. In the second, we add a vector of neighborhood dummy variables that control directly for spatial unobservables. Working within a single county and using the census tract as our spatial unit of observation, there are not readily available neighborhood definitions for us to use for spatial dummies. Fortunately, the Los Angeles Times has defined sixteen regions within L.A. County as part of its "Mapping L.A." portal. 12 The portal provides readers with information about demographics, income, schools and news from each region. For our purposes, it provides a convenient and salient way to define spatial fixed effects that control for neighborhood characteristics for which we do not have data. The map in Figure 3 , taken from the L.A. Times "Mapping L.A." website, describes the sixteen neighborhoods.
Our third specification addresses the possibility that race dynamics between 2000 and 2007 could simply be a reflection of the continuation of previous trends. In particular, we add a control for own-race pre-trends (i.e., the change in racial percentage in the census tract between 1990 and 2000)
to our baseline specification.
Finally, our fourth specification uses an instrumental variable to control for the possibility that NATA cancer risk is correlated with tract-level unobservables. Our instrument is the total quantity (measured in lbs) of toxic released within each tract in 2000. To calculate the value, we sum the total releases 13 for each TRI facility within a one-mile buffer of the census tract. The idea behind the instrument is that more toxic emissions are likely to result in a greater risk of cancer. Of course, the quantity of toxic emissions itself could be correlated with tract-level unobservables. We demonstrate, however, that after controlling for the number of TRI facilities within a one-mile buffer of the census tract, the quantity of emissions is far less correlated with other tract level attributes. In particular, Table 3 reports the results of a series of regressions using each of the variables in the left column as dependent variables. The second column reports the coefficient on TRI emissions quantity using only that variable as a regressor. The third column reports the same coefficient, but does so in a regression that also includes the number of TRI facilities in the census tract as a control. A few important facts emerge. First, NATA cancer risk is significantly correlated with the quantity of TRI emissions even after controlling for the number of TRI facilities. Second, whereas nearly every tract attribute is significantly correlated with the quantity of TRI emissions when that is the only variable included, most are not once we control for the number of TRI facilities. While there are still some attributes exhibiting a significant conditional correlation after controlling for the number of TRI facilities, they tend to be things for which we would expect high income residents to be willing to pay more (e.g., better schools, less crime, and more college educated neighbors). If there were going to be a bias in our IV estimates, therefore, we would expect it to be in the direction of understating 13 According to the Toxic Release Inventory Basic Data File Format Documentation v09, total releases for 2000 include total on and off-site releases from sections 5 and 6 of the Form R. To minimize the possibility that facility counts were driven by reporting requirement changes, we excluded releases of phosphoric acid or lead and lead compounds from the analysis. EPA deleted phosphoric acid (2000) and reduced reporting thresholds for lead and lead compounds (2001).
the willingness-to-pay to avoid exposure to toxics for whites (i.e., the race group with higher per capita income). 
A Structural Model of Neighborhood Dynamics
To better understand the neighborhood dynamics underlying the observed changes in aggregate demographics, we build on the model described in subsection 2.2, placing some structure on (the share of individuals of a particular group in tract k who choose to move to tract j) so that we can identify the role of NATA risk in driving residential mobility. Equations (1) and (2) represented a system of six equations with nine unknown 's, leading to an identification problem.
By parameterizing as a function of location attributes, we overcome the identification problem.
Start with the predicted population in neighborhood j in period B: 
The utility an individual i receives from living in location k is given by:
where refers to the idiosyncratic utility specific to that individual and location. The change in utility an individual i currently living in location k receives from moving to location j is therefore given by:
where MC j,k is our measure of moving costs described in section 3.4. If j = k , MC j,k = 0 , meaning that the change in utility from staying in one's current location is zero.
If is distributed i.i.d. Type I extreme value, then the share of individuals in location k who find it optimal to move to location j is given by the familiar logit functional form:
Similarly, the share of individuals in location k who would find it optimal to remain in that location is given by:
Open Migration Systems
The model of migration becomes complicated when we recognize that many of the observed changes in the distribution of population may actually reflect broader migration patterns into and out of the "system" being considered. The problem of the "open system" is common across papers looking for evidence of residential mobility, and it exacerbates the problem of not knowing all individuals' starting locations and ending destinations. It arises whenever the researcher considers a subset of locations, allowing movements into and out of that subset. Been (1994) , for example, considers only those census tracts surrounding the nuisances used by GAO (1983) and Bullard In the estimation below, we consider movements within L.A. County census tracts (k = 1, 2, …, N) and a single "catch-all" location (k = N+1) that captures all other locations. We discuss below why this simplification and, in particular, the number of individuals assumed to be in the catch-all location, is innocuous when it comes to identification and estimation.
Time periods
We use data from the 2000 decennial census to define period A, and data from the [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] 5-year American Community Survey sample to define period B. Both data sets take 5% samples of the total population. We will refer to the two periods as 2000 and 2007.
Estimation
Estimation is carried out in two stages. We begin by finding the vector of and that best fit the data. Of course, without additional information, this system contains N+2 unknowns and only N+1 equations describing the mapping of populations from 2000 to 2007 in each location. It is therefore still unidentified. We do have access, however, to an additional piece of information that solves this problem. In particular, we observe the share of households in each race subgroup in L.A.
County that do not move between 2000 and 2007. 14 These percentages, described in Table 5, provide us with an additional equation that must hold for each race group R:
Practically, solving for and is made simple by noting that, if we divide both sides of equation (4) by , we get:
14 Specifically, the 2007 3-year ACS describes the year in which each household moved into its current residence. We find the percentage of households who moved into their current house in or before 2000. Note that, in our model, not moving corresponds simply to remaining in the same census tract, while in our data, not moving corresponds to remaining in the same house. Within-tract moves are not common (i.e., 7% of all moves), meaning that this difference should not have a significant effect on our results.
where . 15 Conveniently, given a guess at , equation (11) 
The vector is used to generate predictions of , which in turn are used to generate a new vector . This process is repeated until the difference between .
With the converged values of and the guess at , we then calculate the predicted percentage of the 2007 population who did not move from their tract in 2000, and check to see how that value compares with for the appropriate racial group. We use a bisection method to search over 15 Note that, by introducing the "catch-all" location k = N+1, we effectively make this into a closed system, where anyone entering L.A. County comes from location N+1 and anyone leaving it moves to location N + 1. Of course, the size of the mean utility we ascribe to the catch-all location will be determined by the number of people we assume to be in location N+1 to begin with. This does not present a problem as long as we do not attempt to interpret the mean utility of that location. What is important is that the values of the mean utilities associated with the other locations (k = 1, 2,…, N) are not affected by the assumed population of N+1. We find this to indeed be the case, with our results being essentially identical regardless of whether we define the population of N+1 to be 2, 4, or 6 times the net change in population in (k = 1, 2,…, N) between 2000 and 2007. 16 In general, there is no scale associated with the vector of utility indices (i.e., one could add an arbitrary constant value to all of them and not impact the behavioral shares). As such, a normalization is required. We normalize the values such that they are mean zero.
%Stay R values of that equate predicted to actual , solving for the values of at each step.
Complication: Zero Shares
The methodology described above assumes a positive population share ( ) in each location in each period. In our EJ application, we apply this procedure to different racial groups. Using a high-resolution definition of geography (e.g., census tracts), it is possible to observe tracts containing no members of a particular group. This is, in fact, the case in L.A. County; although only 0.1% of tracts contain no Hispanics, 3.3% of tracts contain no whites. This creates a practical difficulty as equation (12) is not defined for a particular value of j if . 17 We deal with this problem by adding a "patch" -i.e., a small positive artificial population (e.g., ) to each location; all locations will then have positive shares and the procedure described above will be computationally feasible. However, the value of associated with zeroshare locations will become increasingly negative as the value of becomes smaller and smaller
. This would create a problem using a simple least-squares regression technique to decompose . 18 Consider a linear specification of equation (5): (13) 17 The remaining two racial groups are significantly more segregated in Los Angles, with 14.9% of census tracts containing no blacks and 10.0% containing no Asians. While the solution we describe in this section would work for these groups as well, doing so would rely more heavily on the median regression interpretation of our results. We use this as an additional motivation to focus our attention on the two larger and less segregated race groups -whites and Hispanics. 18 Note that we do not have ! data for the "catch-all" location N+1, and the value of ! , k = N+1 depends upon the assumed population of that location. We therefore drop location N+1 from the second stage of the estimation procedure.
In particular, OLS estimates of will vary with the choice of . However, if fewer than half of all locations have positive population shares, we can decompose into its component parts using median regression. Median regression is a particular case of quantile regression (Koenker 2005 ) that is robust to the choice of . With fewer than half of the locations having zero true population shares for any race group, median regression results are invariant to the choice of . Table 7 (discussed below) illustrates this point for whites. Another concern is simply that NATA cancer risk may be correlated with other tract-level unobservables. We therefore employ the same alternative specifications used in the traditional EJ residential mobility regressions in Tables 4 (a) -(d); (i) baseline, (ii) neighborhood fixed effects, (iii) own-race pre-trends, and (iv) instrumental variables. Because we are now estimating median regression, we employ the quantile instrumental variables approach developed by Hansen, and Chernozhukov (2005) for the fourth specification.
Note that, because each race group's δ j is separately normalized so that its mean value is zero, parameter estimates are not directly comparable across race groups; however, the relative tradeoffs individuals make between tract attributes can be compared. A simple comparison can be made considering the tradeoff between NATA cancer risk and other consumption. This can be found
by using µ as our measure of the marginal utility of income. β NATA / µ can thus be interpreted as the willingness to pay to avoid NATA exposure. We therefore report all parameter estimates normalized by the marginal utility of income to facilitate comparisons across groups.
Applying Structural Model to Stylized Examples
Before reporting our results, we apply the structural model described above to the three examples used in Section 2 to illustrate that the traditional EJ model does not identify nuisanceinduced residential mobility. It is a simple matter to show that the structural model is able to successfully identify those dynamics. We assume A simple linear fit applied to those points shows that the structural model is indeed able to recover "coming to the nuisance" behavior in Examples #1 and #3, and "fleeing the nuisance" behavior in Example #2.
Structural Model Results
The first stage of our structural estimation procedure recovers each race group's vector of {δ j } along with values of the marginal utility of income ( ) that make the group's predicted "stay" percentages exactly equal to observed "stay" percentages. These results are described in Table 5 .
Tables 6 (a) -(d) summarize the results of the sorting model using the same four specifications that were used to describe the traditional model -(i) baseline, (ii) neighborhood fixed effects, (iii) ownrace pre-trends, and (iv) quantile IV estimation using the within-tract quantity of TRI emissions as an instrument for NATA cancer risk. Note that, before carrying out the second stage regression, we δ j normalize each group's vector by its marginal utility of income ( ), meaning that all parameter estimates can be interpreted as annual marginal willingnesses to pay (MWTP).
Considering our baseline specification, annual MWTP's to avoid an additional unit of cancer are 32¢ for whites and a statistically insignificant 3¢ for Hispanics. With neighborhood fixed effects, these amounts change to 21¢ and 5¢, while with own-race pre-trends they are 22¢ and 1¢.
Instrumenting for NATA cancer risk changes the marginal willingnesses to pay to 70¢ for Hispanics and $2.30 for whites, suggesting that there may be important tract-level unobservables correlated with NATA risk. This is the direction of bias that typically accompanies estimates of MWTP for pollution reductions when pollution is correlated with desirable unobservable neighborhood attributes, such as economic activity.
The first thing to notice about these results (in contrast to the results of the traditional EJ model) is that, across all four specifications, MWTP for whites is statistically significant and many times larger than that of the Hispanic point estimate, which is always statistically insignificant.
These relative MWTP's therefore mirror the correlations in Table 2 . Our MWTP estimates, moreover, are not a mechanical implication of the 2000 correlations. Rather, they are based on imputed migration flows (i.e., coming to or fleeing the nuisance) between 2000 and 2007. Whites reveal a willingness to give up a great deal more in other consumption relative to Hispanics in exchange for less exposure to NATA risk. As these tradeoffs are the basis for the residential decisions that households make, these results provide strong evidence in favor of the residential mobility hypothesis as an explanation for the observed correlations between race and pollution. This is in sharp contrast to the results of the traditional EJ analysis.
The second important point to note is that NATA cancer risk enters negatively into the utility of both whites and Hispanics; i.e., each group has a positive (although sometimes statistically {δ j } insignificant) willingness to pay to avoid NATA risk. Contrary to many incorrect interpretations of the residential mobility hypothesis, it is not necessary for minority groups to derive utility from pollution in order for their sorting decisions to lead to environmental injustice. Rather, they need only be less willing to make tradeoffs in other dimensions to avoid it.
It is important to interpret this last point in its full social context -especially as it relates to income inequality and the marginal utility of income. To do so, we collect per capita income by race in Los Angeles County in 1999 from the U.S. Census Bureau American Factfinder. 19 Whites have a per capita income of $35,785, while that of Hispanics is only $11,100. Under diminishing marginal utility of income, we would therefore expect whites to place less value on a marginal unit of "other consumption" and be willing to sacrifice more of that other consumption in exchange for less pollution exposure than would Hispanics. The fact that the marginal unit of other consumption may be more valuable to minority groups can help explain why those groups may be less willing to give up that consumption in exchange for reduced air toxics in comparison with whites.
Finally, Table 7 reports NATA cancer results of our baseline specification for whites using alternative values of the "patch" described in sub-section 4.3.4. In particular, ρ = {10 −3 ,10 −6 ,10 −12 }. In order to illustrate the role of the patch, we report estimates in each case using both OLS and quantile estimation. It is immediately clear that the quantile estimate of MWTP to avoid cancer risk is invariant to the choice of the patch. The OLS regression, which uses information from the bottom of the δ distribution is, however, highly sensitive to that choice.
CONCLUSIONS
With the Environmental Protection Agency's reaffirmed commitment to environmental justice in its Plan EJ 2014, learning about the causes and consequences of environmental injustice 19 http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml.
has taken on a renewed sense of importance. We show how the traditional approach used in many EJ analyses cannot identify nuisance-driven residential mobility (i.e., "coming to" or "fleeing from" the nuisance). To overcome the problem, we develop a structural model that uses aggregate census-tract data observed at different points in time to recover evidence of nuisance-driven residential mobility.
It is a practical approach and EJ researchers with access to publicly available census data can replicate this approach in future studies.
In an application to air toxics in L.A. County, we find that the traditional approach yields evidence counter to a residential mobility explanation for observed race-pollution correlations.
Hispanics exhibit a high positive correlation with NATA cancer risk, but show no mobility response in aggregate with respect to the nuisance. Whites exhibit a strong negative correlation, but the traditional approach suggests that they "come to" the nuisance. By default, the traditional model therefore suggests that disproportionate siting of nuisances or unequal enforcement of their cleanup must explain the observed patterns of minority pollution exposure. In contrast, our structural model
shows that whites exhibit a larger marginal willingness to pay to avoid NATA cancer risk than do
Hispanics -a result that corresponds to and can explain their observed correlations. Over the long run, residential dynamics can therefore explain the disproportionate exposure of Hispanics to toxics as well as the persistence of that correlation over time. A similar story is not evident using traditional empirical models found within the EJ literature. We emphasize that differences in MWTP are driven in large part by the differences in the economic circumstances (e.g., low versus high income) in which households make choices rather than indifference to health consequences.
These conclusions highlight important questions about overall policy design and constraints that environmental policy makers may face. For example, residential mobility based on willingness to pay for different neighborhood amenities is likely to counteract the effects of policy targeting equitable site placement. As a result, "solutions" for environmental injustice problems may be more complex than simply changing zoning rules for the siting of pollution sources. Pollution exposure patterns are the result of other sources of inequality -in particular, income inequality. 
